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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population, combining insights from evolutionary game theory and
the study of interaction networks. In earlier studies it has been shown that cooperation is difficult to achieve in
homogeneous networks, but that cooperation can get established relatively easily when individuals differ largely
concerning the number of their interaction partners, such as in scale-free networks. Most of these studies do, however,
assume that individuals change their behaviour in response to information they receive on the payoffs of their interaction
partners. In real-world situations, subjects do not only learn from their interaction partners, but also from other individuals
(e.g. teachers, parents, or friends). Here we investigate the implications of such incongruences between the ‘interaction
network’ and the ‘learning network’ for the evolution of cooperation in two paradigm examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (PDG) and the Snowdrift game (SDG). Individual-based simulations and an analysis based on pair approximation both
reveal that cooperation will be severely inhibited if the learning network is very different from the interaction network. If the
two networks overlap, however, cooperation can get established even in case of considerable incongruence between the
networks. The simulations confirm that cooperation gets established much more easily if the interaction network is scale-
free rather than random-regular. The structure of the learning network has a similar but much weaker effect. Overall we
conclude that the distinction between interaction and learning networks deserves more attention since incongruences
between these networks can strongly affect both the course and outcome of the evolution of cooperation.
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Introduction
Cooperation is common in humans, but difficult to explain. The
reason is that defectors have an intrinsic advantage over
cooperators since they can reap the benefits of cooperation
without contributing to the costs of cooperation [1,2]. There is a
huge literature on this topic, both in the biological and human
sciences [3–5]. Two main mechanisms can help to resolve the
paradox of cooperation. The first is based on the idea that
cooperation is conditional and only directed to individuals that (for
whatever reason) have a high tendency to cooperate as well. The
second is based on non-random interactions: if the population is
structured in such a way that cooperators tend to interact with
cooperators while defectors tend to interact with defectors,
defection will also in a short-term perspective not be a successful
strategy.
Both mechanisms can be studied well in network models, which
are based on the idea that individuals interact in local
neighbourhoods [6–8]. In this framework, population structure is
described by an interaction network, the nodes of which represent
the individual agents while the links correspond to the possible
interactions. A network model typically assumes that at each point
in time all agents are endowed with a certain strategy (i.e. they
have a certain tendency to cooperate); that the agents interact with
their interaction partners, thereby employing their strategy; that
this way they accumulate payoffs; and that subsequently they can
change their strategy by comparing their own payoffs with the
payoffs of their interaction partners. It has been shown that under
these assumptions cooperation can get firmly established, even in
situations as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game where defection is the
dominant strategy in a well-mixed population [9,10]. However,
the emergence and spread of cooperation strongly depends on the
learning rules governing the change of individual strategies on the
basis of payoff comparisons [11,12] and on the structure of the
interaction network [13,14]. As a rule of thumb, cooperation can
get easily off the ground if the interaction network is heteroge-
neous (as in scale-free networks; [15]), while it will not easily evolve
in homogeneous networks (e.g. random-regular networks [6]).
With a few exceptions [16–20], most network models implicitly
assume that payoff comparisons with one or more interaction
partners is the only factor inducing agents to change their strategy.
In other words, individuals can only learn from their interaction
partners. In reality, however, individuals can also learn from
teachers, parents, or peers with whom they not necessarily interact
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in a cooperation game. Hence, we have to face the possibility that
interaction and learning neighbourhoods only partly overlap. Only
few studies consider such an incongruence between the interaction
and the learning network. For example, Ohtsuki et al. find that
breaking the congruence of the interaction network and the
learning network undermines the evolution of cooperation [16,17].
Based on a second modelling study, Wu et al. conclude that
cooperation is generally promoted when the learning neighbour-
hood is larger than the interaction neighbourhoods [20].
In spite of the mentioned progress that has been accumulated,
there are situations that still remain less explored. For instance, to
our knowledge, previous investigations paid little attention to the
topological differences between the two networks. Accepting this
point of view, here we perform a systematic study of how the
evolution of cooperation is affected by various degrees of
incongruences between the interaction and the learning network.
To this end, we consider two standard models for cooperative
interactions in 2-person games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(PDG) and the Snowdrift game (SDG) [14,21–23]. Both games
exemplify that mutual cooperation does not necessarily correspond
to a Nash equilibrium, even though mutual cooperation corre-
sponds to the population state with the highest average payoff. Yet,
both games have a very different strategic structure: the PDG is a
game with one dominant strategy (defection), while the SDG is an
‘evasion game’ where defection is the best response to cooperation,
while cooperation is the best response to defection. Both games are
played by agents whose interaction neighbourhood is character-
ized by an interaction network. Strategy updating occurs like in in
earlier models based on payoff comparisons. However, payoffs are
compared with individuals from the learning neighbourhood, and
the corresponding learning network is not necessarily identical
with the interaction network. We systematically change a
parameter d, which quantifies the incongruence between the two
networks, and ask the question how and to what extent d affects
the degree of cooperation emerging in the course of time. For both
types of networks we consider two variants differing in their degree
of heterogeneity: random-regular networks and scale-free net-
works. As indicated above, cooperation should more easily spread
in scale-free networks, but it is not obvious whether the interaction
or the learning structure is responsible for that.
Model Structure
Overview
To make our results comparable with earlier findings, we largely
follow Santos and Pacheco [15] in their assumptions on network
construction, accumulation of payoffs and the rules for switching
to a new strategy. In our simulations, we consider a population of
n individuals, where n~104 in all results reported. At each point of
time, each individual is in one of two states, corresponding to
cooperation (C) and defection (D), respectively. All simulations
shown were initialized by assigning a randomly chosen state to
each individual, both states having the same probability. In the
course of time, these states can change based on payoff-based
learning. Time proceeds in discrete steps, each step consisting of
an interaction phase followed by a learning phase. Throughout the
interaction phase, each individual uses the same strategy
(corresponding to its state) in all interactions. This strategy (or
state) can only be changed in the learning phase.
The individuals are embedded in an interaction network that
characterizes who interacts with whom. In the interaction phase,
each individual interacts with all ‘neighbours’ to whom it is linked
in the interaction network. Depending on the strategies employed
by the interaction partners, each interaction results in a payoff,
which can be determined from a payoff matrix (see below). All
payoffs thus accrued by an individual i are added, thus yielding a
total payoff Wi for the interaction phase of the time step.
The interaction phase is followed by a phase of social learning,
where individuals can change their state (or strategy) when
encountering individuals having achieved a higher payoff during
the interaction phase. Individuals encounter such ‘models’ in their
learning network. For each individual i, a random model j is
drawn from those individuals to whom it is linked in the learning
network. If the payoff Wj achieved by j in the interaction phase of
the same time step is higher than i’s payoff Wi, individual i will
adopt the strategy of j with a probability f (Wj{Wi) that is an
increasing function of the payoff difference Wj{Wi (see [15] for
details). Otherwise, focal individual i will stick to her previous
strategy.
All simulations were run for 11000 time steps. Simulation
outcomes such as the average frequency pc of cooperators were
scored by taking the average over the final 1000 steps. Simulations
run for much longer time periods revealed that within 10000 time
steps stable levels of the relevant variables were reached that
remained roughly constant over extensive periods of time.
Technically speaking, these stable levels do not correspond to
steady states, since in a finite population fixation on either C or D
will eventually occur due to random drift. For practical purposes,
this can however be neglected in populations of size 104 as
considered here. Therefore the simulation results obtained after
11000 time steps give a good indication of the balance of selective
forces acting on C and D. All the simulation results reported below
are averaged over 100 different realizations of different initial
conditions and networks.
Payoffs
We focus on two paradigm examples for the evolution of
cooperation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) and the
Snowdrift Game (SDG). In both games, individuals can adopt
one of two strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). Cooperation
involves some costs, which we normalize to 1. The benefit of
cooperation is denoted by b. For simplicity, we assume that the
payoff in case of mutual defection is 0 for each player. Under these
assumptions, b is the only free payoff parameter, and the payoff
matrices are given by














In contrast to the PDG, in the SDG the costs of cooperation are
shared by mutually cooperating individuals, and the cooperator
receives the benefits of cooperation even in case of being defected.
In a one-shot PDG, defection is a dominant strategy and,
accordingly, the only Nash equilibrium strategy. In a one-shot
SDG with bw1, none of the two pure strategies is a Nash
Incongruence between Interaction and Learning Environments
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equilibrium strategy. Instead, there is mixed Nash equilibrium
strategy, which in a well-mixed population corresponds to
cooperation with probability pc~(2b{2)=(2b{1).
Two types of network
Both for interaction and learning networks, we consider two
types of network: random-regular networks and scale-free
networks. A random regular network [24] is a network whose
links are randomly generated but where every node has the same
degree k (i.e. the same number of ‘neighbours’). All results
reported in this study are based on k~4. A scale-free network [25]
is a network whose degree distribution follows a power law (k{l),
at least asymptotically. Here, for any scale-free network, we first
generated a virtual network via the mechanisms of growth and
preferential attachment as described in [25] and get its degree
sequence. Then, these degrees are randomly given to the nodes of
the target network and linked randomly according to the degree
sequence. Different from the method in [25], we can generate
scale-free networks with the same degree distribution but different
links. All results reported in this study are based on l~3, yielding
an average degree of 4. We used two different methods to achieve
an incongruence d between the interaction and the learning
network. These methods will be explained below.
Simulation Results
Scenario 1: Overlapping interaction and learning
environments
A natural way to study incongruences between interaction and
learning neighbourhoods is to assume that individuals base their
strategy-updating on payoff comparisons with part of their
interaction neighbourhood and some additional individuals
outside of this neighbourhood. To model this, we first constructed
a random regular interaction network with degree k. This
interaction network served as the starting point for constructing
the learning network. For each value of the incongruence
parameter d (where 0ƒdƒ1) a fraction (d) of all connections of
the interaction network was randomly discarded. Subsequently,
the network was randomly completed again, until a regular
network (the learning network) with degree k was obtained. This
way, the learning neighbourhood of an individual consists on
average of (1{d)k of her interaction partners and dk other
individuals.
Fig. 1 illustrates the simulation results. As expected, the
frequency of cooperation at steady state is positively related with
the benefit b of cooperation. In the PDG (left panel), cooperation
only gets a foothold in the population if b is very high, and even in
this case only reaches relatively low frequencies. In the SDG,
cooperation reaches appreciable frequencies even at moderate
values of b, and it often even reaches fixation. The main focus of
our study is the effect of the incongruence d between interaction
and learning network on the evolution of cooperation. Fig. 1
clearly shows that the degree of cooperation decreases with d. For
the range of b-values shown, cooperation in the PDG completely
disappeared for dw0:5, while fixation of cooperation in the SDG
did not occur for dw0:4. Still, the effect of d on the evolutionary
outcome is not really dramatic: an incongruence of, say, 20%
between interaction and learning network (d~0:2) has an effect on
the degree of cooperation, but this effect is relatively small when
compared to the standard scenario where individuals only learn
from their interaction partners (d~0).
The above method for constructing two networks with a given
degree of incongruence is easily applicable to regular networks, but
much less so for other types of network. A certain fraction of
connections of the interaction network can of course be discarded
for all types of network, but it is not straightforward on how to re-
establish links in such a way that a specific type of learning
network results. Since we want to study combinations of networks
of a given type, we will now address incongruences between
interaction and learning network by a different approach.
Scenario 2: Internal and external learning environments
In a second scenario, we start with two networks that are
created separately. The first of these networks is the interaction
network, while the second network corresponds to the additional
sources of information individuals might use for updating their
strategies (e.g. teachers, parents, peers). This second network will
be called the ‘external learning network’, while the ‘internal
learning network’ is identical with the interaction network. In
scenario 2, payoffs are accrued due to interactions in the
interaction network. Payoff-based learning takes place as follows:
with probability 1{d individuals base their choice on whether to
switch to another strategy on the payoff comparison with a
randomly chosen member of their internal learning neighbour-
hood (i.e., with a randomly chosen interaction partner); with
probability d the payoff comparison is being made with a member
of the external learning neighbourhood. Since both networks are
generated separately, we can now consider various combinations
of regular random and scale-free networks. The simulation results
for these combinations are illustrated in Fig. 2 for the PDG and in
Fig. 3 for the SDG.
Let us first consider Fig. 2. The upper left panel corresponds to
a situation where both the interaction network and the external
learning network are random-regular networks with degree k~4.
Not surprisingly, the outcome resembles that in the left panel of
Fig. 1, where both the interaction and the learning network were
also random-regular with the same degree. Yet, cooperation is
achieved under a broader range of d-values in scenario 2 than in
scenario 1. This can be explained as follows. Take for example the
case d~0:25, where on average one learning event takes place
outside the interaction network. In scenario 1 (Fig. 1), on average
three of the k~4 interaction partners are ‘earmarked’ as learning
partners, while each individual has on average one additional
(fixed) learning partner. In scenario 2 (Fig. 2) all four interaction
partners can act as learning partners (in case of internal learning),
while there are four different learning partners in case of external
learning. We presume that the possibility of payoff-based learning
with all interaction partners is mainly responsible for the fact that
cooperation is more easily achieved in scenario 2. This does not
only apply to the PDG but also to the SDG (compare the left panel
of Fig. 1 with the upper right panel of Fig. 3).
In all four panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 the frequency of
cooperation is positively related to the benefits b of cooperation
and negatively related to the incongruence d between interaction
and learning environments. In addition, the type of network has a
marked effect on the evolution of cooperation. In both games, a
much higher frequency of cooperation is achieved when the
interaction network is scale-free than when it is random-regular.
This is fully in line with earlier results indicating that cooperation
is favoured by network heterogeneity [6,13,14,26–28]. The
structure of the external learning network has a similar - be it
markedly weaker - effect: for the same values of the parameters b
and d a higher frequency of cooperation is achieved when the
external learning network is scale-free than when it is random
regular. If both networks are scale-free, cooperators can dominate
the population (pcw0:5) in the PDG even for a high degree of
incongruence (dw0:8), while this never happened even for high
Incongruence between Interaction and Learning Environments
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values of b and in the absence of incongruence (d~0) when the
networks were random-regular.
Qualitatively, the same conclusions can be drawn as for scenario
1: incongruences between the interaction and the learning network
are unfavourable for the establishment of cooperation, but the
effect is mainly noticeable in case of strong incongruence. In fact,
in case of scale-free interaction networks the incongruence has
been quite large (dw0:5) before ‘outside learning’ has a strong
effect on the evolution of cooperation.
Analytical Results: Pair Approximation Dynamics
Since it is useful to complement individual-based simulations with
a mathematical analysis, we will now extend the pair approximation
method, which has successfully been applied in the special case
where the learning network is identical with the interaction network
Figure 1. Degree of cooperation achieved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG, left) and in a Snowdrift game (SDG, right) as a
function of the benefit b of cooperation and the incongruence d between the interaction and the learning network. The simulation are
based on scenario 1, where interaction and learning network overlap and both are random-regular networks with degree k~4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090288.g001
Figure 2. Frequency of cooperation achieved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a function of the benefit b of cooperation and the
incongruence d between the interaction and the external learning network. The simulations are based on scenario 2. Both networks can
either be random-regular or scale-free. Cooperation is strongly favoured when the interaction network is scale-free (bottom row) and weakly
favoured when the external learning network is scale-free (right column).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090288.g002
Incongruence between Interaction and Learning Environments
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[23,29]. The pair approximation method tracks the frequency
distribution of all possible strategy pairs s1s2 (where s1 and s2 are
either cooperation c or defection d), that is the frequency of all
network links where one player employs strategy s1 while the other
player employs strategy s2. This way, the method accounts for at
least some of the spatial structure emerging in a network.
We apply the pair approximation method to the special case
where the interaction and the learning network are both random-
regular, and where learning individuals learn from a randomly
chosen interaction partner with probability 1{d and from a
randomly chosen individual from the (external) learning network
with probability d. Hence the approach taken corresponds to
scenario 2 considered above. Moreover, we derive the equations
for the special case k~4, but we include k in the equations in
order to make them more transparent.
Let ps1s2 denote the expected frequency of s1s2 pairs (where
s1s2~cc,cd,dc,dd ) in a population. Accordingly the frequency of
cooperators and defectors are given by pc~pcczpcd and
pd~pdczpdd~1{pc, respectively. Following the treatment of
Hauert and Doebeli (see the supplementary information to [23]),
we will now derive differential equations for the change in ps1s2
over time. A change in strategy pairs can only occur in the event
that a player (let us call her A) changes her strategy as the result of
learning from another player B. Such a change in strategy can
only occur if the two players differ in strategy, that is, if either A
used C and B used D or vice versa. The probability that a potential
learning event takes place in such a configuration is in both cases
given by pcd~pdc. The rate of change of ps1s2 due to such learning
event is given by this probability times the probability that player
A adopts player B’s behaviour times the net change in the number
of s1s2 pairs caused by the switch in A’s behaviour. As indicated in
the Overview section above, the probability that A adopts B’s
behaviour is given by f (WB{WA), where f is an increasing
function of the payoff difference between players B and A. We will
now consider four different cases.
(a) B belongs to the interaction network of A (which we
symbolize by L~I ); A used C and B used D in the interaction
phase. As indicated in Fig. 4(a) defector B had one cooperating
neighbour (A) and three other neighbours with strategies u, v and
w. Each of these strategies is either C (with conditional probability
pdc=pd ) or D (with conditional probability pdd=pd ). The payoff of B
is given by wd (C,u,v,w), which indicates the payoff of a defector
confronted with the given configuration of neighbours. Similarly,
A had one defecting neighbour (B) and three other neighbours
employing strategies x, y, and z. These strategies are either C (with
conditional probability pcc=pc) or D (with conditional probability
pcd=pc), and the payoff of cooperator A is given by wc(D,x,y,z).
For each neighbour configuration, player A will switch from C to
D with probability f (wd (C,u,v,w){wc(D,x,y,z)). Let nc(x,y,z)
denotes the number of cooperators among those neighbours of A
that are not identical with B. Then A was involved in nc(x,y,z)
CC-pairs and in k{nc(x,y,z) CD-pairs before the change in
behaviour. By switching from C to D, this changes into nc(x,y,z)
CD-pairs and in k{nc(x,y,z) DD-pairs. Hence the change in A’s
behaviour results in a loss of nc(x,y,z) CC-pairs and a net change
of nc(x,y,z){(k{nc(x,y,z))~2nc(x,y,z){k CD-pairs. Since we
distinguish between pcd and pdc (in line with [23]), half of the
change in CD-pairs (i.e. nc(x,y,z){k=2) ascribed to the configu-
Figure 3. Frequency of cooperation achieved in a Snowdrift game as a function of the benefit b of cooperation and the
incongruence d between the interaction and the external learning network. The simulations are based on scenario 2. Both networks can
either be random-regular or scale-free. Cooperation is strongly favoured when the interaction network is scale-free (bottom row) and weakly
favoured when the external learning network is scale-free (right column).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090288.g003
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ration CD and half to the configuration DC. Summarizing all this,
the expected change in the frequencies of CC and CD pairs due to
a potential learning event of a cooperator A confronted with a






























(b) B does again belong to the interaction network of A (L~I ),
but now A used D and B used C in the interaction phase. The
calculations are completely analogous to case (a) above. Now
defector A had nc(x,y,z)z1 cooperating neighbours and was
therefore involved in nc(x,y,z)z1 DC-pairs and in
k{nc(x,y,z){1 DD-pairs during the interaction phase. By
switching from D to C, this changes into nc(x,y,z)z1 CC-pairs
and in k{nc(x,y,z){1 CD-pairs. Hence the change in A’s
behaviour results in a gain of nc(x,y,z)z1 CC-pairs and a net
change of (k{nc(x,y,z){1){(nc(x,y,z)z1)~k{2nc(x,y,z){2
CD-pairs. As before, half of the latter change (i.e.
k=2{nc(x,y,z){1) is ascribed to the configuration CD and half






























(c) Now B does no longer belong to the interaction network of A
(which we symbolize by L=I ); A used C and B used D in the
interaction phase. The configuration L=I is illustrated in Fig. 4(b):
A and B are no longer interaction partners and instead have
interaction partners playing strategies x, y, z, s (playerA) and u, v,w,
t (player B), respectively. Consider again the case that A used C and
B used D in the interaction phase. When nc(x,y,z,s) denotes the
number of cooperating interaction partners of A, A was represented
in nc(x,y,z,s) CC-pairs and in k{nc(x,y,z,s) CD-pairs. If A switches
from C toD, this results in nc(x,y,z,s) CD-pairs and in k{nc(x,y,z,s)
DD-pairs. Hence the change in A’s behaviour results in a loss of
nc(x,y,z,s) CC-pairs and a net change of
nc(x,y,z,s){(k{nc(x,y,z,s))~2nc(x,y,z,s){k CD-pairs. As
above, we can now summarize the expected change in the
frequencies of CC and CD pairs due to a potential learning event































Figure 4. Diagrams illustrating a potential learning event. In (a) the focal individual A learns from an individual B that is part of A’s interaction
network (L~I ). Since k~4, both A and B have three other interaction partners, whose strategy (C or D) is indicated by x, y, z(A) and u, v, w(B),
respectively. In (b) A learns from an individual B that does not belong to A’s interaction network (L=I ). Now both A and B have four different
interaction partners.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090288.g004
Incongruence between Interaction and Learning Environments
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e90288
(d) B does not belong to the interaction network of A (L=I ), but
now A used D and B used C in the interaction phase. Completely






























Taking all four cases together and considering that B belongs to
A’s interaction network (cases (a) and (b)) with probability 1{d,
while B is external to A’s interaction network (cases (c) and (d))


















Taking into consideration the symmetry condition pdc~pcd ,
plus the constraint the constraint pcczpcdzpdczpdd~1, the
above equations can be treated by setting _pcc~ _pcd~0 and solving
for pcc and pcd , thus the equilibrium density of cooperators can be
obtained from pc~pcczpcd .
Thus, we can investigate how cooperation is affected by the
incongruence between networks, d, and by the main payoff
parameter b. As illustrated by Fig. 5, the pair approximation
approach yields qualitatively the same conclusions as our earlier
simulations: cooperation is favoured by large values of b but
hampered by a larger incongruence between the learning and the
interaction network. Quantitatively, the pair approximation
method predicts a lower degree of cooperation than the
simulations. This is understandable, since the evolution and
maintenance of cooperation reflects the emergence of spatial
structure (clusters of cooperators). This structure can be potentially
quite rich, and only part of it may be captured by the pair
approximation method.
General Conclusions
In this paper, we aimed to investigate the influence of
incongruence between the interaction network and learning
network on the cooperation evolution. In both the PDG and the
SDG it turned out that cooperation is hampered if these two
networks do not coincide. This is easy to understand: cooperation
can be maintained once clusters of cooperative individuals have
formed. Individuals from such a cluster will only change her
strategy if they encounter a defector, and such a change is unlikely
unless the defector has a high payoff. If the individuals of a cluster
of cooperators learn from each other, they are not inclined to
change their strategy, since they will not meet defectors. This is
different if these individuals can also learn from ‘outsiders’. Once
one individual in a cluster of cooperators has switched to defection,
this can have a snowball effect, since this individual can serve as a
model for its neighbours as well. In view of this, the most
interesting conclusion of our study is perhaps that a rather strong
incongruence between the networks is required before the degree
of cooperation drops to considerably lower levels.
For the standard model where individuals learn from their
interaction partners it is well established that the type of network
has a considerable effect on the degree of cooperation. In general,
Figure 5. Equilibrium level of cooperation as predicted by the analytical pair approximation method. As before, the degree of
cooperation achieved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG, left) and in a Snowdrift game (SDG, right) is shown as a function of the benefit b of
cooperation and the incongruence d between the interaction and the learning network. Since the pair approximation method is based on scenario 2,
the panels should be compared with the simulation results shown in the upper left panels of Figs 2 and 3, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090288.g005
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cooperation can be more easily achieved in heterogeneous
networks (like scale-free networks) than in homogenous networks
(like random regular networks) [15]. Our results confirm this
finding and indicate that the heterogeneity of the interaction
network is much more important than the heterogeneity of the
learning network. In both kinds of network, a switch from a
random regular network to a scale-free network results in a higher
degree of cooperation, but the effect size is much larger when the
interaction network is more heterogeneous than when the learning
network is more heterogeneous.
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